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T
hink of the following
situations: senior executives
within a firm vying to be
promoted to chief
executive; pharmaceutical
companies trying to be first to patent the
cure for a disease; money managers trying
to beat the market; track athletes
competing in the Olympics. What is 
the common characteristic across all 
these activities?
Winning in all these different
environments depends on participants’
relative performance. In other words, it
does not matter how good you are in
absolute terms – for example, how fast
you can run 100 metres – but whether
you can run faster (even by a hundredth
of a second) than your competitors.
What’s more, the reward for winning
is often substantial: the pharmaceutical
firm that discovers a new drug can
generate monopoly profits for the life of
the patent; the manager of the fund with
the highest returns will not only be
rewarded generously but his fund will also
receive the majority of new investments;
and the gold medallist will not only gain
fame but more sponsorship than any 
other athlete.
There are many examples of such
‘tournaments’, where rewards are fixed in
advance, concentrated at the top and
based on relative rather than absolute
performance. 
Economic analysis of the incentives
these tournaments create and their effects
on participants’ efforts indicates two
outcomes. First, the bigger the prize for
victory, the more effort the competitors
put in; and second, in settings where there
is a single winning prize, the prize
awarded to the winner increases with the
number of competitors (see Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983,
and Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). Evidence
from both sports and corporate life
broadly confirms these predictions. 
OK on effort, but what 
about risk?
But in practice, competitors often do not
only choose their effort: they also have to
decide between more or less risky
strategies. For example, a pharmaceutical
firm that is lagging behind in a patent
race may start exploring more risky
projects; and a money manager with
below market returns might start investing
in more risky assets.
Taking a more risky strategy may have
worse outcomes on average, but it may be
the only hope a laggard has to win the
competition. Whether it makes sense also
depends on the options available to the
leader, and on whether competitors can
observe each other’s strategies.
Unfortunately, economic theory offers
ambiguous predictions about what
happens when competitors are able to
choose both their effort and the riskiness
of their strategies. What’s more, it is rarely
possible to observe the risk and effort
Many areas of economic activity take the form
of ‘tournaments’, where what matters is your
performance relative to the performance of
others.To assess the effects of such reward
systems on participants’ performance and the
risks that they take, Christos Genakos and
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decisions that participants take. How
could we possibly know whether the
senior executives in a firm are following a
more or less risky strategy, or whether the
athletes in a race are taking more or less
risky actions?
Despite the importance of the issue,
there is little empirical evidence on
competitors’ risk-taking, effort choices and
performance in environments with
tournament-like incentives. As a result,
most of the evidence to date comes from
laboratory experiments. Our research looks
at non-experimental data from
weightlifting competitions to examine
professional athletes’ choices about effort
and risk-taking in a tournament setting.
Weightlifting, a sport where
competitors attempt to lift heavy weights
mounted on steel bars, has the unique
characteristic that athletes have to
announce in advance the amount they
intend to lift. In other words, it is possible
to observe not only whether athletes’
efforts to lift a given weight are successful,
but also, since attempting to lift a heavier
weight is riskier, the strategy that they
follow.
We analyse round-by-round data on
the performance of professional
weightlifters in international
championships, including the Olympics,
between 1990 and 2006. The panel
dimension of our data allows us to control
for multiple sources of unobserved
heterogeneity at the athlete, competition
or year level.
What’s more, the multistage nature of
the competitions allows us to estimate our
parameters of interest simply by observing
the behaviour of athletes during a given
competition. For example, we can
investigate whether a given athlete ranked
first takes the same risks as when ranked
eleventh, and whether the probability of a
successful lift for a given weight is
different for an athlete depending on his
current rank in the tournament.
A lesson or two from 
the professionals
We establish two main results. First, 
risk-taking exhibits an inverted U-
relationship with rank: risk-taking
increases up to rank six and then
monotonically decreases moving towards
the bottom of the ranking. In other words,
the same athlete will attempt to lift a
heavier weight (0.8kg or 51% more than
the average discretionary incremental
announcement) if he is ranked sixth than
if he is ranked first.
Although the athlete would be
awarded a higher score if he were to lift
the weight successfully, the chance of a
successful lift decreases, indicating that he
is willing to take more risk. In contrast, if
the same athlete drops from being ranked
sixth to eleventh, his attempted weight
will decrease by 0.2kg (or 13% of the
average discretionary incremental
announcement), indicating that he is
willing to take less risk.
Athletes try to protect their position
with relatively safe strategies when leading
the competition. Risk-taking is highest
when there is a chance of winning a
medal, and lowest towards the bottom of
the ranking when the chances of reaching
the top are slim.
The concentration of rewards at the
top also suggests that tournaments with
these characteristics encourage
participants to take more risks overall.
Indeed, we find that there is more risk-
taking in more prestigious competitions
like the Olympics, where the rewards are
higher.
Second, we find that the probability of
a successful lift, conditional on the chosen
weight, increases moving down the
rankings. In other words, an athlete has a
lower probability of successfully lifting a
given weight if he is ranked first than if he
is ranked eleventh.
This is surprising. Given the structure
of prizes, we would expect athletes to be
more motivated and exert more effort
when ranked near the top, where the
reward for a successful lift is significantly
higher, so that the probability of lifting a
given weight increases when an athlete is
higher ranked.
This finding suggests that athletes may
perform badly under pressure, even
though motivation and effort may be
high. Such an interpretation is consistent
with anecdotal evidence that athletes’
performance may indeed deteriorate when
the importance of a successful lift
increases – a phenomenon known as
‘choking under pressure’.
We show that athletes do ‘choke’
more frequently in more prestigious
competitions or when the competition
becomes tougher (in the sense that there
are more athletes with similar
performance). We also find evidence that
‘choking under pressure’ affects both
experienced athletes (those who have
already won a medal or previously
participated in international competitions)
and inexperienced athletes. This is in sharp
contrast to previous research in
behavioural economics, which highlights
the importance of experience in
overcoming psychological biases.
Finally, we contribute to the broader
debate on tournaments by measuring the
impact of a counterfactual reward system.
Specifically, we consider a piece-rate
contract, in which each athlete is
rewarded at each stage in proportion to
the overall amount successfully lifted. This
is similar to many workplaces, in which
workers are paid based on their absolute
performance.
Our analysis reveals that tournaments
encourage more risk-taking than this
linear reward scheme. If a piece-rate






















would attempt to lift smaller weights and
they would succeed with higher
probability. On average, the incentives
provided by the tournament decrease the
overall total of successful lifts, but it
increases the probability of some
outstanding performances (which may be
what the spectators want to see).
Careful with those bonuses…
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has blamed
the ‘unconscionable’ system of generous
bonuses paid to investment bankers for
exacerbating the global credit crisis: ‘The
system of compensation almost surely
contributed in an important way to the
crisis. The system was designed to
encourage risk-taking – but it encouraged
excessive risk-taking. In effect, it paid
them to gamble.’
Overall, our findings suggest that
tournament-like incentives – such as
promotions and bonuses – can change
workers’ behaviour and could be a
powerful tool in the hands of capable
managers. Individual workers are typically
more risk-averse than large corporations:
since they typically only have one job, it is
understandable that they do not want to
risk it. Managers may use tournaments to
induce risk-averse workers to innovate,
experiment and ultimately take risky – but
profitable – strategies. 
On the other hand, our results show
that tournaments can be too successful in
encouraging risk-taking, leading to
excessive risk and lower average
performance. While this may be ideal in
sport, in which suspense and extraordinary
performances are what the spectators
want, it may not be so desirable within
firms. If firm profitability is affected more
by average performance than by the rare
exceptional performance of a few
individuals, then tournament-like
incentives may encourage unconscionable
risk and reduce overall performance. 
This article summarises ‘Risk Taking and
Performance in Multistage Tournaments:
Evidence from Weightlifting Competitions’ by
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Relative performance
evaluation schemes 
may induce the
phenomenon of ‘choking
under pressure’, lowering
overall performance